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Introduction  
I work with research in organic farming, especially the philosophy and methodology of systemic 
research. In our work with research in organic farming, the relations between science and values are 
pivotal issues of inquiry. This is the background for the present presentation, which will include the 
following topics: 
–  sustainability and precautionary acting 
–  conceptions of nature and of the relationship between human and nature  
–  the historical extension of ethics 
–  moral responsibility and moral considerability 
–  moral significance and concepts of value 
–  two paths of extending moral considerability 
–  a cybernetic model of ethical acting 
–  four dimensions of extension of ethics 
–  towards a systemic ethics 
 
Sustainability and precautionary acting 
Agriculture is an intimate, common interface between human and nature. And therefore the 
questions of sustainability and precautionary acting have become important issues in agricultural 
research. There are, however, a rich diversity of meanings of sustainability and precaution.  
 
Gordon Douglass (1984) made it clear that "agricultural sustainability" means different things to 
different people, and that it can be defined in different ways and sought through different means. 
Douglass distinguishes between three dominant visions of agricultural sustainability: food 
sufficiency, stewardship and community, which are used by different groups with different views 
and values. Sustainability as food sufficiency looks at population growth and speaks of sustainability 
in terms of sufficient food production, with the necessary use of technology and resources. 
Agriculture is an instrument for feeding the world and economic cost-benefit analysis is the 
instruction, which guide application of that instrument. In this group we find the defenders of the 
modern "conventional", industrialised agriculture. Sustainability as stewardship is concerned with 
the ecological balance and the biophysical limits to agricultural production. From the ecological 
point of view, sustainability constrains the production and determines desirable human population 
levels. This is a diverse group of  "environmentalists", often with a concern for the limits to growth 
in a finite global environment. Sustainability as community resembles the ecological point of view, 
but with special interest in promoting vital, coherent rural communities. Cultural practices are taken to be as important as the products of science to sustainability, and the values of stewardship, self-
reliance, humility and holism are encouraged. In this group we find the "alternative" forms of 
agriculture, and modern organic farming has also originated from within the community group.  
 
The meanings of precaution in relation to environmental hazards and ecosystem health issues are 
also quite diverse. Two distinct meanings of environmental precaution are entailed in the concepts 
of environmental risk assessment and the precautionary principle. Environmental risk assessment is 
concerned with the calculation of proportional risks and benefits from available scientific 
knowledge, while the precautionary principle prescribes acting before scientific evidence is 
available, early detection of dangers, and promotion of cleaner technologies (Kasanmoentalib, 
1996; Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994).  
 
Conceptions of human and nature 
Inquiring into the diversity of concepts of agricultural sustainability and precaution, conceptions of 
nature and of the relationship between human and nature play an important role. Figure 1 shows 
different conceptions of nature (modified from Schwarz and Thompson, 1990): A nature without 
limits of its own, which we may call robust nature, where human impacts and use of natural 
resources are only limited by economic and social growth. This is the conception of nature found in 
mainstream neo-classical economics as applied to environmental issues, as far as it adheres to a 
strong principle of infinite intersubstitutability - that all natural resources are substitutable by 
human labour, capital and technology (Norton, 1992). It is not a "who cares?" conception, where 
nature is of no importance, but a strictly economical view of nature. In opposition to this conception 
of nature is the vulnerable nature, where almost any human impact will push nature beyond the 
limits.  
(After Schwarz & Thompson 1990)
Vulnerable nature
Tolerant nature
Who cares?
Robust nature
 
  Figure 1:  Conceptions of nature as more or less vulnerable   
 
 
Ecological economics challenges the assumption of infinite intersubstitutability and the robust 
conception of nature, arguing that certain elements, relations or processes of nature represent 
irreplaceable resources, which constitute a separate category of capital, natural capital. Natural 
capital can be "critical" in as far as it is not substitutable with the conventional forms of human 
  2capital (Norton, 1995; Goodland, 1995:14). This view of natural capital is now also entering the 
mainstream economics (Danish Economic Council, 1998). We may characterise the conception of 
nature in ecological economics as a tolerant nature, a nature that is vulnerable, but which tolerates 
human impact within certain limits. Hence, the type and scale of human impact becomes of key 
importance. Within environmental economics the two different "paradigms", neo-classical and 
ecological economics, give rise to a distinction between weak and strong sustainability, 
corresponding to the distinction between a robust and a tolerant nature (Daly and Cobb, 1990). 
 
The different conceptions of nature shown in figure 1 have no explicit reference to human's place in 
nature. Taking a broader perspective on our conceptions of nature, which includes both human and 
nature and the relationship between human and nature, we may distinguish between two different 
kinds of conceptions of nature, the distinctive and the systemic (figure 2). The distinctive kind of 
conception of nature sets man as separate from nature, often by characterising the natural as the 
uncontrolled, that which has not been changed or inflicted upon by man, in contrast with human 
culture. There are two opposing views of nature within the distinctive conception, which we may 
call the agriculturalist's perspective and the natural historian's perspective.  
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  Figure 2:  Distinctive and systemic conceptions of human and nature 
 
 
The "agriculturalist's" perspective on man and nature, which takes the controlled and ordered nature 
to be good nature, has deep roots in the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, as indicated by God's 
command to man to "be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion 
over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the 
earth" (Genesis 1:27-28). The "agriculturalist" conception of man apart from nature is presupposed 
in the view of nature as robust in figure 1. The "natural historian's" perspective, which takes the 
wild and authentic nature to be good nature, has been one of the motivating factors in the 
conservation movement.  
  3The systemic kind of conception of nature sees humans as an integral part of nature. Here, we can 
find two opposing, but not incompatible, perspectives on agriculture and nature in the form of 
ecological agriculture and ecological or environmental science.  
 
Within the philosophy of sustainability, Paul B. Thompson (e.g. 1996; 1997) distinguishes between 
two, and only two, philosophical meanings of sustainability: resource sufficiency and functional 
integrity, a distinction which corresponds to the distinction made above between distinctive (though 
resource sufficiency only refers to the "agriculturalist's" view) and systemic conceptions of nature. 
Within conservation philosophy a similar distinction has been suggested between two 
complementary schools: compositionalism, corresponding to a distinctive view (though 
compositionalism only refers to the "natural historian's" view), and functionalism, corresponding to 
the systemic view (Callicott et al., 1999).  
 
Important general issues in the discussions on sustainability and precaution include:  
–  the expanded influence of humans on nature, on a regional and global scale 
–  the growth of human technological action ability  
–  the possibility of corrupting human life support systems, and hence the life of future generations 
–  the growth of knowledge, and the limits of knowledge and control 
–  growing understanding of the systemic relations between humans, other living beings, and 
global geo-physical processes 
–  Earth as a delimited oasis in space 
 
In the present paper these issues will be considered within an ethical framework. And the ethics that 
can embrace these issues and the connected normative concepts of sustainability and precaution 
may, in this respect, be called a systemic ethics. This approach towards a systemic ethic is described 
in more detail in Alrøe & Kristensen (in prep). In the following, an outline of systemic ethics will 
be given, taking off in a view of ethics as critical reflections upon good acting and good living. This 
approach resembles Hans Jonas's ethics of responsibility, where the concept of responsibility is 
placed at the very centre of ethical theory (Jonas, 1984). 
 
The historical extension of ethics 
The history of ethics shows an extension of ethics from ethics where only ones fellows are 
considered, towards the inclusion of equal men, slaves and women. In the latter centuries the 
universalistic theories of ethics have considered all persons (beings of reason), all human beings or, 
more recently, all sentient beings worthy of moral consideration. And today, the possible further 
extension of ethics to include living beings and ecosystems is discussed.  
 
This historical extension gives cause for an analysis of the dimensions of ethics in which the 
extension takes place. First we shall look at the extension beyond the symmetry between moral 
responsibility and moral considerability, a symmetry presumed in the socalled golden rule: "In 
everything, do to others as you would have them to do to you …" (Here from Matthew 7:12). After 
that, a more complete set of dimensions of ethical extension will be sought.  
 
Moral responsibility and moral considerability 
Kenneth Goodpaster made the important distinction between moral responsibility and moral 
considerability, in the context of environmental ethics (Goodpaster, 1978). Such a distinction is the 
foundation for an asymmetrical ethics, where the range of moral considerability goes beyond those 
who are themselves capable of moral acting. 
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In the following it is presumed that ethical acting is conditioned upon self-awareness – that ethical 
responsibility presupposes self-conscious moral agents capable of reflecting upon their intentions 
and actions. The limit of moral considerability in a symmetrical ethics must therefore be drawn at 
self-aware beings – only persons are morally considerable.  
 
Taking moral considerability as distinct from moral responsibility leaves the question of moral 
considerability open. There are different approaches and arguments as to where the limit of moral 
considerability is to be drawn. The symmetrical ethics, where only persons are morally 
considerable, is a logically consistent position, but excludes young children and mentally disabled 
humans from moral consideration. On the other hand, considering all human beings, but no other 
sentient beings, worthy of moral consideration seems to be difficult to defend against a charge of 
chauvinism (e.g. Routley and Routley, 1979), because there seems to be no logical means of 
establishing human beings as a separate category. 
 
In modern thought about animal rights, or animal liberation, the key arguments concern the capacity 
to suffer, or to experience pain and pleasure. Hence, the limit of moral considerability is often 
drawn at sentient beings (leaving the definition of sentient beings a subject of discussion). Others, 
like Goodpaster, draw the limit at living beings. But few include all things as morally considerable. 
 
Moral considerability and moral significance – the question of value 
In discussing moral considerability it is equally important to distinguish between considerability 
and significance (Goodpaster, 1978). Considerability does not imply significance. Saying that all 
living beings are morally considerable does not imply that they are equally significant, that a mole 
should be treated equally to a person. Moral considerability corresponds to the concept of intrinsic 
value in environmental ethics, in the sense of “being capable of valuing” or “having value in itself” 
(e.g. VanDeVeer, 1995). Moral significance concerns the weighing between subjects of moral 
consideration, and thus corresponds to general concepts of value, such as direct (aesthetic or 
experiential) value and indirect (instrumental) value. 
 
The possible positions in relation to moral considerability and moral significance are often 
discussed in terms of the concepts of anthropocentrism, where only humans (or persons), are 
morally considerable, and non-anthropocentrism, where moral considerability includes more than 
humans, or persons. Biocentrism is a less precise term, which is sometimes used in the same sense 
as non-anthropocentrism, and sometimes in the sense that all sentient (or living) beings are equally 
morally significant. 
 
Two paths of extending moral considerability 
Returning to the concepts of sustainability and precaution, we need to consider the possible 
extension of moral considerability to communities and ecosystems. Are ecosystems, for example, 
morally considerable?  This approach takes up the tradition from Aldo Leopold's "Land Ethic", as 
promoted by J. Baird Callicott (e.g. 1979; 1982). 
 
I shall argue that there are two different paths, along which moral considerability may be extended: 
an individualistic and a systemic path. This distinction builds on two related ideas: That ecosystems 
cannot be mended within an individualistic approach to considerability, and that the concern for 
ecosystems and communities is different from the combined concern for individual entities within 
the system.  
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The historical extension of ethics to all men, all humans, and all sentient beings has been squarely 
within the conventional individualistic approach in western thought. Some, like William K. 
Frankena (1979), have sought to place the concern for ecosystem within the individualistic frame, 
with the effect that the considerability of ecosystems is found to be the same as the considerability 
of "everything". Others equal ecosystems to living organisms, but this seems empirically unfounded 
since ecosystems are not teleological systems in the same way as organisms are. 
 
The extension of ethics can be seen as involving an extension of the self (Næss, 1974:177ff). Within 
a systemic perspective, there are two paths of extending the view of oneself: By way of identifying 
with individuals of more or less the same kind, in the spirit of "love thy neighbour like thyself" – 
the individualistic path of extension. And by way of identifying with larger communities or systems 
of which one is, more or less unconditionally, a part – the systemic path of extension. This second 
path of extension moves from oneself towards more and more inclusive systems of which one is a 
part, such as the family, the local biotic or ecological community, and the global ecological 
community. It is, off course, possible to include other systems than those mentioned, and there is 
not one but many possible hierarchies of systems – the same way that other kinds of individuals 
may be included in the individualistic path, because there is no one right way of identifying with 
"others like me". 
 
Four dimensions of ethical extension 
In a fuller analysis of the dimensions of ethics – the kind of "space" in which the extension of ethics 
may take place – the relevant dimensions must be determined from some kind of model of ethics. 
Here, the dimensions will be determined from a cybernetic model of ethical acting (figure 3). This 
approach is in line with the understanding of ethics as reflections on good acting, and with the kind 
of systems theory found in second order cybernetics (Foerster, 1984). In the cybernetic model we 
find the moral agent; the intentions in relation to some subject of moral consideration ("the other", 
which may be an individual or a system); the action and the actual consequences of the action; and 
the informative feedback on the actual consequences for "the other".  
Moral agent  Action Consequences
“The other”
Informative feedback
Intentions
  Figure 3:  A cybernetic model of ethical acting 
 
 
This cybernetic model of ethical acting gives rise to four dimensions in which ethics may be 
extended (figure 4). The first two make up the distinction, mentioned above, between moral 
responsibility, referring to the moral agent, and moral considerability, referring to the moral 
subject. Moral responsibility is traditionally restricted to the individual person, but there are reasons 
for talking of collective social (and global) responsibility, as in the "tragedy of the commons" 
  6described by Garrett Hardin (1998). The dimension of moral considerability refers to both the 
individualistic and systemic extensions described above.  
 
Considerability
Awareness
Action
ability
known
consequences
unknown
consequences
intentions
things
sentient beings
humans
fellows
global
ecological
community
cumulative
individual
technological
social
global
personal
Responsibility
living beings
oneself
family
local
community
persons
ecological
or biotic
community
individualistic: systemic:
  Figure 4:  Four dimensions, along which ethics may be extended  
 
 
The third dimension, action ability, is related to the actual actions and their consequences. The 
expansion of action ability may be cumulative, as in the increase of the size of the human 
population, and it may be technological. The ethical implications of the technological expansion are 
discussed in detail by Hans Jonas (1984). The increase in actual and potential human influence on 
earth is an important aspect of the problems of sustainability. 
 
The fourth dimension, awareness, is related to the nature of the informative feedback from the 
consequences of action, with a possible extension from intentions (no feedback) to known 
consequences (e.g. utilitarian ethics), and further on to unknown consequences. The inclusion of 
unknown consequences – the acknowledgement of the limits of knowledge and the use of this 
awareness in decisions and practice – is exemplified in the use of the principle of precaution in 
environmental regulation. And the extension of awareness to include uncertainty and limits of 
knowledge also plays an important role in sustainability, at least in some meanings of sustainability. 
 
Towards a systemic ethics 
If we take ethics to be critical reflections on good acting and good living, in the tradition of 
Aristotle, an authoritative religious foundation of ethics seems superfluous. And authority may even 
be an obstruction towards a suitable ethics for the new millennium, in as far as it blocks the road of 
inquiry. 
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In a systemic ethic of responsible action, the growth in technological action ability is a question to 
be considered within ethics, together with the question of the limits of our knowledge of – and our 
means of learning about – the consequences of our actions. Such an ethic is founded on the 
increasing awareness of the intimate systemic relations between the different beings on Earth, 
between humans in society, and between society and nature. Facts and values are in constant 
interplay in ethics, since the world, and our understanding of the world, is always changing and 
human values are transformed in accordance with knowledge and awareness. The systemic ethics 
calls attention to certain limits to human acting and living, but it does not prescribe one unitary or 
optimal way of acting and living. Within certain common limits, it leaves space for a pluralism of 
ways of living in accordance with different visions, structures of meaning, and spiritual approaches. 
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